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I. Introduction
The rapid escalation of energy prices in late 1973 and early 1974
has a dominant role in most accounts of the deep recession of the mid-1970s.
This paper attempts a quantitative appraisal of that role with respect
to real output, prices,and employment in the US economy. It finds that some
but not all of the traumatic features of the recession can be reproduced
within a simple macroeconomic model with an energy sector. Part of the
large decline in real output and in employment can be attributed to the two
mechanisms that have been proposed to link energy price shocks to aggregate
economic activity: higher energy prices drive up interest rates and
depress investment on the one hand, and reduce real incomes and so depress
consumption on the other hand. But our results do not fully explain
another critical feature of the recession -- the worsening of inflation in
1974 and its continuation at a high level in 1975. Either this inflation
is partly attributable to conditions in labor and product markets that were
much stronger than the unemployment rate of around five percent suggested,
or our characterization of the influence of energy prices on wages and
other prices is deficient. Much remains to be understood about the
inflation of the 1970s.
Our model incorporates the modern hypothesis of rational expectations,
but it is also somewhat Keynesian in treating money wages as predetermined
in the short run. In a purely classical economy where wages clear the
labor market instantaneously, an unexpected energy price increase would
have little or no impact on output, employment or prices. When the price
of one factor, energy, increases, the prices of other factors, especially
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the wage, would fall to offset it. Full employment should always prevail,
and the price level should be linked directly to the money stock. In our
model, on the contrary, wages respond slowly to unexpected changes in
energy prices (and to all other surprises in the economy). During the
period following an energy price increase but before the accommodating change
in the wage, labor is priced too high for full employment. The model
contains an explicit treatment of this aspect of the effect of an energy
price shock; investment and interest rates play an important role in the
relation between the sticky wage rate and the resulting level of employment.
When energy is partly imported, as in the US of the 1970s, another
consideration links output and employment to an unexpected increase in
energy prices -- higher prices make the US poorer and so reduce the level
of consumption in real terms. Often this is compared to the imposition of
a tax on US consumers with the proceeds going to foreigners. As the US is
made poorer, energy-supplying nations become richer. They acquire claims
upon the US and face the choice of accumulating the claims (as government
or corporate bonds, stocks, direct investments and so on) or cashing them
in for goods produced in the US. At one extreme, if oil producers decide
to accumulate all of their claims, the fall in aggregate demand associated
with the decline in US real income is not offset at all. Placing purchases
in third countries would have the same effect on the demand for US goods, at
least temporarily. At the other extreme, oil producers might take all of
their proceeds in the form of US goods, in which case there would be a
full offset of the reduction in US consumption, and aggregate demand would
be unaffected on this account. Our model does not attempt to explain the
choices of oil producers in this regard, but uses a guess that oil producers
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consume out of their new income at the same rate as domestic consumers.
If anything, this is probably an understatement of the effect that this
transfer of wealth had on the demand for goods.
The model does keep track of one important feature of the balance
of payments aspects of the energy price shock that is often overlooked
-- as foreigners accumulate the debt of the US, the US capital stock
increases accordingly. Though the deficit in the balance of payments is
generally considered an adverse outcome of the energy price increase
(and is, from the perspective of aggregate demand), it can also be viewed
as a capital inflow adding to the productive capacity of the US economy.
This inflow has a favorable effect on aggregate supply.
II. The Model
The model used here is an extension of one described by Hall (1978);
some of its details are explained more fully there. The present model
treats the economy as having two sectors, goods and energy. Goods in-
clude all goods and services, including finished energy products. Labor,
capital, and energy produce goods. Total goods production is allocated
among investment, consumption, government expenditures, net exports of
goods, and deliveries of goods to the energy sector. It differs from
real GNP by the amount of the last item, which is small, and net energy
imports. Only the goods sector is fully represented in the model. The
energy sector is viewed as establishing a predetermined dollar price of
energy, at which it will supply any amount of energy demanded by the
goods sector. The energy sector uses labor, capital and goods to extract
energy. Its product is primary energy such as crude oil, natural gas
at the wellhead, and coal at the mine mouth. For simplicity, there is
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a single price of energy, though it should be recognized that this is
only a rough approximation. Note that energy demand not satisfied by
domestic production is met by imports. The price elasticity of domestic
energy supply is not considered here.
Within the goods sector, the critical elements of the model are the
production function, the specification of the investment process in-
cluding lags, the specification of the lag in wage determination, and the
demand function for money. The production function can be described in
the following way: Labor and capital together produce an intermediate
product called value added, according to a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Then value added combines with energy to produce goods, in fixed ratios.
This accord with Mork's (1978b) finding that the demand for primary energy
is nearly inelastic in the short run and his evidence and that of many
earlier investigators that the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor is around one.
In the short run, the model assumes that the economy's ability to
adjust the capital stock is limited. Part of the investment in the next
few years is already committed today and cannot be adjusted in response to
new information. The details on the incorporation of this consideration
in the model appear in Hall (1978).
The lag in wage determination is incorporated in a similar way,
except that it is the nominal wage, not the quantity of labor services,
that is committed in advance. When wages are set, they clear the labor
market, or come as close as they can given current information about
future demand for labor. When unexpected events occur, such as the
doubling of the price of energy considered here, the demand function for
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labor determines the level of employment, which may then be well below
the supply of labor. This characterization of the Keynesian hypothesis
of wage rigidity is described in more detail in Hall (1978). It is an
attempt to embody the view that the labor market achieves equality of supply
and demand in the long run but that the process takes time. It implies a
kind of Phillips curve for the economy. However, in place of the expected
inflation term that has been the source of so much instability and conceptual
ambiguity in the literature on the Phillips curve, expectations of future
labor demand are formed using the model itself. In particular, feedback
from prices to wages occurs in the model to the extent that price increases
signal current or future increases in the demand for labor (as they
typically do). However, as will emerge in the ensuing discussion, there
is a negative, not a positive feedback from energy prices to wages. Wage
setters are viewed as knowing that higher energy prices depress the demand
for labor, with the money stock held constant. In the light of this
knowledge, wage inflation is moderated when energy prices rise. One
alternative to this view is the following: Because price increases generally
signal increased demand for labor, employment contracts are explicitly
or implicitly linked to prices by cost of living escalators. Then the
initial impact of an energy price increase is to raise wages, even though
the eventual response of wages is to fall. We have not so far incorporated
this phenomenon in the model.
In the money demand function, the major issue is the specification
of the variable that measures the dollar volume of transactions. The
use of nominal gross national product for this purpose is one of the
many reasons that macroeconomic models in existence in 1973 were unable
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to deal effectively with the energy price shock (see Pierce and Enzler,
1974) -- nominal GNP subtracts imports and so cancels out much of the
effect of higher energy prices. We use the dollar volume of output from
the goods sector as a proxy for transactions. This variable makes sense
in view of the fact that much of the money stock is in the hands of con-
sumers, not businesses. We neglect the small contribution to the demand
for money that might come from the energy sector (recall that all energy
passes through the goods sector on its way to final demand),
The total gross output of goods is divided between gross investment
and what we will call predetermined expenditures; this relationship is
the equivalent of the GNP identity of a one-sector model. Note that it
is stated in terms of the gross output of goods, not value added,
Predetermined expenditures include the following:
Consumption of goods
Net exports of goods (excluding trade in energy)
Government expenditures on goods
Deliveries of goods to the energy sector
The reasons for avoiding a "consumption function" to provide an explanation
of the movements of consumption are discussed by Hall (1978). Briefly, the
empirical evidence seems to support the view that consumption decisions
are based on intelligent appraisals by consumers of their total well being,
including the present value of future income. As a result, there is no
simple relationship between consumption and current or lagged values of
income or other variables. The marginal propensity to consume out of a
change in income depends on the context of the change. Rather than try to
do; P:~kLPiigl ~
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build a model of this kind of behavior, we have chosen at this stage to
use an outside estimate of the effect of the oil price increase on
consumption.
Our treatment of the net exports of goods is similar. A proper
model of the decisions of foreigners about the timing of purchases in
the US is even more difficult, though many of the same principles are
involved. Further, as is conventional in macroeconomic models, government
expenditures are taken as exogenous. Finally, the model does not attempt
to deal with the technology of the energy sector itself. The small flow
of goods to that sector is considered exogenous.
III. Mathematical statement of the model
Variables of the model are:
Y: Gross output of goods in 1972 dollars
X: Real value added in goods production in 1972 dollars
L: Employment, millions of workers
K: Capital stock, billions of 1972 dollars
E: Total domestic energy use, billions of 1972 dollars
I: Investment in equipment, structures and inventories,
billions of 1972 dollars
Z: Predetermined expenditures on goods, billions of 1972
dollars
p: price paid by buyers of goods, 1972 = 1.000
PX: price received by sellers for value added, 1972 = 1.000
PE: price of energy, 1972 = 1.000
v: real rental price of capital, dollars per dollar of
capital per year
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r: nominal interest rate, per year
M: Money stock, currency and demand deposits, billions of
current dollars
The basic equations are:
Central accumulation
Kt = It + 1 + Kt 1
6 = rate of depreciation
= 0.10
Allocation of output
Y = I +Z
Money demand
log (PY) = 0 + l1r + 2 t
l1 = coefficient of the interest rate
= 2.0
"2 = trend rate of growth of velocity
= .027
Equality of nominal rate of return on capital and nominal interest rate
Pt+l - Ptv-6-O+ r
Pt
e rate of taxation of capital
= 0.1846
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Production function
Y = min {X/y, E/(l-y)}
y = units of value added required per unit of output
= 0.9766
X = a elt La K1 -a
= rate of growth of productivity
= .019
The additional complications in the production function to take account
of investment and wage committments are described in Hall (1978) and are
not repeated here. The distribution of investment committments is such
that 17 percent of investment is flexible in the first year, 44 percent
within the first two years, 72 percent within the first three years, and
is entirely flexible within four years. The distribution of wage
committments is such that 17 percent of wages are flexible within the
first year, 33 percent within the first two years, 50 percent within the
first three years, 67 percent within the first four years, 83 percent
within the first five years, and they are entirely flexible within six
years.
IV. Estimates of the effect of the energy price shock
Our first step was to prepare a base case describing the possible
evolution of the economy from 1973 in the absence of the abrupt increase
in the price of energy. Table 1 shows the assumptions in the base case
and the model's corresponding projections. The price of energy was assumed
to rise at 6.5 percent per year. The other determinants of inflation, the
committed wage and the money stock, were assumed to rise at about 7.5 percent
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per year and 6 percent per year respectively. Investment committments
in existence at the beginning of 1974 extended forward to 1976 and were
assumed to be at the same level in 1975 as 1974 and then to rise moder-
ately in 1976. The labor force, expressed as the natural rate of employ-
ment, was assumed to grow at about 1.4 percent per year.
The model's projections are based on the absence of any surprises
or shocks. The employment rate is close to its natural or equilibrium
rate of 6 percent. The wages actually set (the "flexible wage rate") are
close to the committed levels. Actual investment is also close to its
committed levels. Real output grows smoothly and inflation proceeds at
just over 5 percent each year.
Table 2 presents the model's estimates of the effects of an un-
expected increase in the price of energy starting in 1974. Here the
price of energy takes an unexpected jump of 80 percent in 1974 relative
to its value in the base case. There is an additional but much smaller
surprise in 1975, so in that year and all subsequent years the price of
energy is 95 percent higher than in the base case. These figures were
chosen to approximate the actual events of 1973-1975. Note that the
increases are in addition to the expected annual increases of 6.5 percent
per year that appear in both cases.
As we explained earlier, the model does not attempt to deal with
the effect of the oil price increase on consumption or on the demand of
the rest of the world for US goods. We approximated the net response to
the loss in permanent income, caused by the recession, by making a downward
adjustment in predetermined expenditures of an equal percentage amount in
-11-
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all years starting in 1974. We chose the magnitude of the adjustment
-- 0.8 percent -- according to the following criterion: Excessively high
levels of predetermined expenditures bring about a growing condition of
capital shortage in the US economy, Real interest rates rise over time,
output falls, and eventually the capital stock falls to zero, This
indicates that predetermined expenditures have been set at too high a
level. On the other hand, levels of predetermined expenditure that are
too low bring about capital saturation, with the real yield of capital
eventually dropping below zero. There is a unique permanent adjustment
in predetermined expenditures that maintains the economy in an approximate
steady state, with neither capital shortage nor saturation, By extra-
polating the model's solution to 1992, we were able to find the appro-
priate adjustment. Since the extrapolation is necessary to find the
initial price level for reasons given by Hall (1978), this did not involve
any extra effort.
We also made a 1% upward adjustment of the committed wage rate.
This may be interpreted either as the effect of escalator clauses in wage
contracts or as an adjustment that corrects for the exaggerated price
flexibility in the model.
The energy price shock generates a recession in the model, although
a somewhat modest one. The shock works its way through the model in the
following way. Since wages are largely predetermined in 1974, the sharp
energy price increase causes a jump in the price level. As a consequence,
the demand for money increases, i.e., the LM-curve shifts to the left.
The financial tightening drives up interest rates, thus discouraging
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investment, and hence output. The resulting loss in real wealth depresses
consumption both now and later, which reduces investment even more.
In 1974, the model estimates that the total impact of the energy
price shock on real output was a reduction of about 21 billion 1972 dollars,
or 1.7 percent. Of this, 9 billion is the direct effect of the decline in
predetermined expenditures and another 12 billion is a decline in investment
induced by the mechanism described above. The negative effect on GNP is
largest the second and third years after the shock, in 1975-1976, when real
output is down by more than 30 billion 1972 dollars. The bulk of this
is decreased investment. The fall in real output is accompanied by a
decline in employment of nearly 2 million workers in the worst year, 1975,
and a corresponding increase in unemployment of 2.1 percentage points.
It isworthmentioning here that the model does not attempt to take account
of cyclical variations in productivity, so it overstates the size of the
employment and unemployment effects of a given decline in output. The
model does not do justice to Okun's Law.
The model predicts very modest effects of the energy price increase
on the overall price level. The effect is largest in the first year, 1974,
when it is 2.2 percent. In 1975 and later years, the effect on the price
level is smaller than this, so the model makes the interesting prediction
that the energy price increase that took place in 1974 slightly reduced
the rate of inflation in later years; it concentrated most of its effect
on the rate of inflation in 1974. In the model, something that is known
to have a one-time influence, such as the energy price increase, does not
have a persistent upward effect on the rate of inflation. A larger price
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effect for 1974 could have been obtained with a different specification
of the technology, as discussed below. Interestingly, however, this
would have strengthened rather than weakened the dampening effect on
future inflation rates.
For comparison, the actual behavior of the US economy 1974-1977 is
displayed in Table 3. The picture is one of higher inflation and a deeper
recession than our model generates. The recession predicted by the model
seems very tame in comparison with the actual experience in 1974 and 1975,
when real GNP fell below its predicted value by 4 percent in 1974 and
nearly 9 percent in 1975. In part this reflects a much larger actual
reduction in consumption and exports of something like 50-60 billion in
1972 dollars rather than the 8 or 9 billion used in Table 2. This decline
comes mostly from consumption as net exports did not decline until 1976.
The rest of the fall in GNP is a much larger decline in investment in 1975
than is predicted by the model. We solved the model with the actual drop
in predetermined expenditures and found that the predicted total reduction
in real output was about the same as the actual reduction for 1974 and one
half of actual for 1975.1 In other words, part of the severity of the
1974-1975 recession is attributable to a much larger drop in consumption
and exports than makes sense within out model, and the rest is a larger
drop in investment than would be predicted by the model even if it
accepted the actual drop in predetermined expenditures.
The unemployment rate predicted by the model is much closer to
actual than output is. This is, however, somewhat deceiving since
1Under this assumption, the drop in investment turned out much smaller
than in Table 2.
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the model has no cyclical fluctuation in labor productivity and therefore
overstates the effects in the labor market.
There are a number of ways that the model could have been changed
that would have helped generate a more severe recession. The event that
sets off the recession in the model is the exogenous increase in the price
level. Thus, any modification that could give a higher impact on the price
level of an increase in the price of energy would also produce a deeper
recession. It may thus be worthwhile to consider the short-run price
mechanism in our model in a little more detail.
The price of energy covers all forms of crude energy: crude oil (and
refined imports), natural gas, coal, hydroelectric power, and nuclear power.
For oil, the price is assumed to be the crude oil WPI (which covers domestic
oil only), multiplied by the ratio of average to domestic crude oil price
as quoted by the Monthly Energy Review. In this sense, we have assumed that
the price equalization program was effective. For natural gas, we have
assumed that the effective price rose by the full amount of the average
oil price increase (in BTU equivalents) and the price regulations merely
transferred rents from producers to those consumers with access to gas.
For coal, the WPI was assumed to be satisfactory. The prices of hydro
and nuclear power were assumed to have followed the price of coal. We
then computed the price of energy in the model as a Divisia index based
on the oil and coal prices.
The implicit "price equation" of the model has a simple linear form:
the price of goods is a weighted average of the price of energy and the
price of value added (the latter is a geometric average of the wage and
-18-
the price of capital), The weights are technical coefficients of the
fixed coefficients production function: 0.023 for energy and 0.977 for
value added, which closely matches energy use in the US economy over
the 1970s. With the price of value added held constant, an increase of
the energy price index from 1.32 to 2.57, the increase for 1975 incorporated
in Table 2, should raise the price level by .029 or 2.2 percent of its
1975 level in the base case. Thus the direct effect of the energy
price increase, abstracting from any feedback through the wage or price
of capital, is itself quite mild in our model.
The price level response also depends on the assumption of pricing
behavior. Our model assumes marginal cost pricing in the short as well as
the long run, We are aware that many economists believe that standard
unit cost pricing is a better approximation to reality. With the same
technology specification, this would have raised the price level increase
from 2.2 to 3,2 percent because of the feedback through the price of
capital. This relationship between marginal cost and average cost pricing
does not hold universally, however, but depends crucially on the form of
the technology. Thus Mork (1978c) finds a partial response of 5.6
percentage points over the period 1973:2-75:4. The reason for the
difference is that Mork's technology specification is homothetic in the
short run (i.e., in labor-energy space) whereas ours is not. Inclusion
of this technology specification in our model could have changed our
results substantially. The reasons why this has not been done at the present
stage are partly technical. Also, since our results are so sensitive to
-19-
such details, more careful research is needed before firm conclusions can
be drawn.
The net effect of the energy price increase on the price level depends
on some important indirect effects. The price of value added responds to
the price of energy in a number of ways within the model. First, energy
prices affect the prices of capital goods. This effect takes time; only
when investment is flexible does the price of capital influence the
marginal cost of production. Second, energy prices affect interest rates,
though this turns out to be numerically unimportant as an influence on
the price level in the model. Third, energy prices affect total output,
which in turn influences prices through a "demand effect" in the implicit
price equation of the model. Since marginal cost pricing is assumed, this
effect is quite strong in our model; it lowers the 1975 price level by
about 1 percent in 1975. This is contradicted by most empirical evidence
but is kept in the present version of the model mainly for technical
reasons. Since the observed price rigidity can be interpreted as the
influence of cyclical variation in labor productivity (cf. Mork (1978a),
it might be possible to generate rigid prices within our framework of
marginal cost pricing if a cyclical component of productivity is added to
the model. Fourth, wages respond to the various economic effects of the
energy price increase. This turns out to be the critical issue. As we
mentioned earlier, not only is the magnitude of this response a matter of
debate, but even its direction. To the extent that wages are indexed to
the cost of living by escalator clauses, the immediate effect on an energy
price increase, or any other price increase, is to push wages up.
-20-
However, in our model, wages are re-negotiated every few years according
to the overlapping schedule described in an earlier section. At the
time of re-negotiation, wages are set so as to provide employment for all
of the relevant labor force. Then the effect of a price increase depends
on its context. If it is part of a general pattern of inflation, wages
will rise. If it is the result of a higher price for energy, however,
wages will fall -- everything else held constant, the demand for labor
declines in the short as well as the long run when the price of energy
rises. This effect is even slightly exaggerated in our model because of
the overstatement of the labor market effects discussed above. Whether
this is the way that wages are actually determined is unsettled. Note
that the strong historical correlation of wages and prices provides no
evidence on the point. Most changes in both prices and wages have resulted
from the general process of inflation and are consistent with both views
about wage determination. Further, the fact that both wage and price
inflation accelerated around the time of the energy price shock is not
by itself evidence that energy prices have a strong positive effect on
wages, since both may have been influenced by an inflationary shock from
another source.
As mentioned above, our model is extreme in the sense that the energy
price increase has only a negative impact on the wage level. Partly as
an ad hoc correction for this, and partly as a compensation for the
strong demand effect in the model, the committed wage rate was adjusted
upwards 1% in the simulation run underlying Table 2. As shown there,
this is offset by a 0.4% wage decrease in 1974. As more and more wages
are re-negotiated, the negative influence of energy prices on wages becomes
-21-
evident, reaching 1.9 percent in 1978. Because of the growing strength
of this negative influence, the net effect of the energy price increase
on the price level declines over time. Further, part of the inflationary
impact in the early years is offset by the effect of decreased real output
on prices.
A key assumption about policy in these results is that the money stock
is not influenced by the energy shock. Monetary policy is pushed in oppo-
site directions by the price shock. On the one hand, expansion could
limit the adverse effect on real output and employment. On the other
hand, contraction could limit the inflation resulting from the shock.
Various monetary reactions are considered in the next section. For now,
the assumption of no monetary response together with the "neutrality of
money" in the long run within the model limits the effect of energy prices
on the general price level. In the long run, the money stock is the
primary determinant of the price level, and this strongly limits the
potential long-run effect of the energy price shock on the price level
under our assumption of no monetary response. In the short run, a burst
of inflation from energy or any other source other than money supply has
an adverse effect on real output. Our model predicts that this effect
is quite strong relative to the predictions of other models. The com-
paratively small effect of the energy price shock on real output comes
from the small magnitude of the shock, not from the weakness of its link
to real output. Thus, a larger price response of the energy price shock
would increase the magnitude of the recession generated by the model.
A deeper recession would also be the outcome if one specified energy
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and capital as complementary in production. A number of researchers have
found this complementarity in their data, but it is still a matter of con-
troversy. The implication it would have in our model is an additional in-
centive to low investment in the years following the shock. Since invest-
ment represents the marginal adjustment of capital, a large reduction in
investment could be produced even by a modest degree of complementarity.
Missing from this calculation is any attempt to deal with the impact of
the oil shock on the export demands of other countries for US goods. By
making exports fall far enough, we could have simulated a recession as severe
as the one that actually occurred. This would be a relatively uninteresting
exercise, however. If the oil shock could cause only a minor disturbance in
the US economy considered independently, there seems little reason for it to
induce a worldwide recession. That is, the observed decline in export demand
cannot necessarily be attributed to the energy price increase.
Finally, we have not considered any direct effects of the oil embargo.
Findings by Mork (1978b) indicate a genuine shortage of primary energy may
have existed in early 1974. The impact of this cutoff of supply on the rest
of the economy is a topic of future research.
In summary, we have been able to explain a part of the 1974-75 recession
as the result of the energy shock. With a better model specification it may
be possible to explain more. We are doubtful, however, that it would be appro-
priate to ascribe the whole recession to this shock alone.
V. Policies to Offset the Macroeconomic Impact of the Energy Shock
Though the effects of the energy price shock on output, employment, and
prices predicted by our model are not large, their form could have been
altered by manipulation of macroeconomic policy instruments. For
example, with a suitable expansion of the money supply, the effecs of the
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shock on output and employment could be attenuated or even eliminated, at
the cost of more inflation. Table 4 illustrates such a policy. In the
base case, the rate of money growth was around 6 percent in all years.
By assumption, the rate of growth remained unchanged in our analysis of
the impact of the price shock in the previous section of the paper. The
third column of Table 4 shows the rates of monetary expansion needed to
eliminate the effect of the energy shock on real output. In the main
year of the shock, 1974, almost four extra percentage points of
monetary growth are needed -- 10.2 percent in place of 6.3 percent, A
small amount of extra money growth is also needed in 1975 -- 7.9 percent
in place of 6.3 percent. In 1976 and subsequent years, no further expansion
is needed beyond that assumed in the base case.
Monetary policy does not liberate the economy from the tradeoff
between inflation and unemployment. Eliminating the effect of the energy
shock on output and unemployment brings about more inflation, as the
middle columns of Table 4 show. In the base case, inflation was about 5.3
percent in all years. As discussed in the previous section, the energy
price shock by itself raised inflation in 1974 when wages were largely
unable to respond, but in subsequent years, inflation was less in the
aftermath of the energy shock than in the base case. The monetary policy
that eliminated the effect of the shock on output and employment amplifies
the inflationary response. The inflation attributable to the shock in-
creases by 50 percent in 1974 in the presence of the monetary response --
it is 3.2 percentage points higher (8.5 percent as against 5.3 percent in
the base case). Without the monetary response, the energy shock brought
about only 2.3 percentage points of extra inflation. In subsequent years,
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inflation settles back to about the same level as in the base case. It
does not dip below as it did in the case of a pure energy shock.
We could also study the effect of a monetary policy that insulated the
pricelevel against the impact of the energy shock, at the expense of ampli-
fying the effect on real output and employment, but the rough magnitude
of those calculations can be inferred from the results just presented.
An extra four percentage points of money growth brings about an extra 0.9
percentage points of inflation and an extra 1.9 percentage points of real
output growth. Thus, elimination of the 2.3 percentage points of inflation
in 1974 attributable to the energy shock would have required a reduction in
money growth of about 10 percentage points. This in turn would have
retarded real output growth by about 4.8 percent, and brought it down to
-1 percent in 1974. Even with the monetary authorities taking such an
extreme anti-inflationary stance, the economy would not attain the large
negative rates of output growth actually observed in 1974 and 1975. Again
it does not seem credible that the severe downturn of those years can be
attributed solely to the energy shock.
The other macroeconomic policy instrument that was advocated as a
method for offsetting the effects of the energy shock is fiscal policy.
Changes in government expenditures bring about changes in aggregate demand
directly, or changes in income taxes can influence consumption and thereby
operate indirectly. Since our model does not contain a consumption function,
we do not try to answer the question of how large a tax cut is needed to
stimulate consumption by a given amount. Rather, following Hall (1978),
we simply analyze the effect of a shift in the predetermined expenditures
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variable, which contains both government expenditures and consumption.
The extra expenditures needed to stabilize the unemployment rate
at roughly 6 percent in the face of the energy shock are shown in the
first column of Table 5. These are measured relative to the level of
predetermined expenditures used in our simulation of the energy shock.
Recall that we lowered expenditures in that case by a few billion dollars
to take account of the effect of the recession on the well-being of
consumers in the long run. In Table 5, there is effectively no recession
because of the offsetting fiscal policy. Thus the "extra expenditures"
include the favorable response of consumers to the fiscal policy. In
Keynesian terms, the first column includes not just the direct increase
in government expenditures, but also the multiplier response of consumption.
For example, the increase in expenditures of 40 billion 1972 dollars
required in 1975 might have been achieved by a combination of an increase
of 20 billion in expenditures plus a multiplier effect of the same magnitude.
In the short run, the fiscal stimulus is just as inflationary as the
monetary stimulus examined earlier. Fully offsetting the effects of the
energy shock on unemployment and real output pushes the rate of inflation
in 1974 to 8.5 percent, as against 7.6 percent in the absence of any policy
response. In the year after the shock, 1975, fiscal policy is a bit more
inflationary than monetary policy -- 6.6 percent inflation as against
5.7 percent -- even though the fiscal policy generates a slightly lower rate
of real growth. Output growth is also low in 1976, and then rebounds in
1977 and 1978. The period of low growth coincides with the two years of
large increases in expenditures, and is not accidental. When government
and consumers are demanding a larger volume of output, investment must
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necessarily be lower than it would be otherwise. Capital accumulation
suffers, and output falls because capital is an important input to
production. When capital accumulation accelerates in 1977 and 1978, real
growth resumes.
Accompanying this shortfall in output in the years of heavy government
expenditure is a slight acceleration of inflation, In this simulation, the
money stock is held constant. When real output falls, the price level
rises. The effect lasts only two years. When capital accumulation moves
above its rate in the base case in 1977 and 1978, price inflation dips
below its rate in the base case.
The negative addition to spending in 1978 is done in order to offset
the shortfall of investment in 1974-76. It turns out that the reduction in
productive capacity becomes catastrophic in the long run unless consumption
or government expenditures is reduced at a later date. Offsetting the
recession by increased spending now requires reduced spending later,1 We
solved this problem in the model by reducing spending by about 10 billion
dollars for ten years starting in 1978. This dynamic aspect of fiscal
policy is largely ignored in Keynesian models with a weak representation of
the supply side.
The use of government stockpiles of fuels may be considered a third
type of policy to offset an energy price shock. The argument would be that
increased supply would postpone the price increase and thus eliminate the
surprise effect. It may be argued that this is consistent with the
rational expectations hypothesis.
Note that this has nothing to do with the government's budget constraint
since none exists in the model. It is, however, related to the constraints
on the economy in a deeper sense.
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It is, however, highly doubtful that this policy could be successful.
Since fuels are storeable, the market price is likely to increase already
at the time a future price increase is announced. Energy buyers are given
an incentive to hoard, as are producers to hold back supply. Thus,
although a sufficient postponement of the price increase would eliminate
the recession in our model, this policy cannot be considered a serious
alternative to monetary and fiscal policy.
VI. Conclusions and Agenda for Further Research
We conclude that we have been successful in constructing a reasonable
macroeconomic model that is capable of generating a recession as the result
of a sharp, unexpected increase in the price of energy. It is worthwhile
repeating the mechanism that makes this happen. With wages rigid in the
short run, the energy price increase pushes the price level upwards. With
an unchanged level of real transactions, this creates an excess demand for
money for transaction purposes. The resulting financial tightening
increases the cost of capital and thus discourages investment. On the
other hand, consumers realize that they are worse off because the growth
potential of the economy has been diminished. Thus, consumption falls as
well as investment, and the economy is in a recession.
The model is less successful in retracking the inflation of the late
1970's. A few changes in the model could improve this result. First,
the direct impact on the price level of an energy price change could be
increased by modifying the implicit price equation in the model. Secondly,
the indirect effects -- the demand effect and the effect on wages -- could
be made more realistic by including cyclical productivity and a better
-30-
representatiQn of the effect of inflation on wages in the medium run.
Thirdly, the assumption of exogenous monetary policy may be relaxed.
The recession generated in the model economy is much smaller than the
one observed in 1974-75. To some extent we believe this is right; other
forces than the energy shock are likely to have been responsible as well.
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to look for changes in the model
that could contribute to a more realistic recession. One such change is
to make the price response stronger, because the recession is caused by the
inflationary shock. Capital-energy complementarity is another because it
would allow a larger drop in investment. Thirdly, it might be worthwhile
exploring direct cutoff effects of the embargo. Finally, introduction of
cyclical productivity would give a more realistic response of employment to
fluctuations in output.
This long list of possible changes means, of course, that much remains
to be understood about the 1974-75 recession and inflation. Nevertheless,
we feel satisfied that we have clarified one important aspect which, in the
very least, is a necessary ingredient of any complete explanation.
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